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Abstract—We propose and evaluate a novel improvement to
a previously published, unreliable covert channel based on the
network traffic of multiplayer, first person shooter online games
(FPSCC). Covert channels typically embed themselves within
pre-existing (overt) data transmissions in order to carry hidden
messages. FPSCC encodes covert bits as slight, yet continuous,
variations of a player’s character’s movements. These variations
are visually imperceptible to human players, yet occur frequently
enough to create a low bit-rate covert channel. The nature
of first person shooter network protocols means the original
FPSCC channel is noisy (not reliable), experiencing a significant
number of bit errors (including synchronisation errors). We have
now augmented FPSCC to ensure bits are transmitted reliably.
Evaluation of our technique with a prototype demonstrates
throughput of up to 13 bits/second without any bit errors.
Index Terms—Security, Covert Channels, Online Games
I. INTRODUCTION
Unlike encryption (which makes communication between
two parties hard to decipher by a third party), covert channels
aim to hide the very existence of communication between
two parties. Adversarial relationships between individuals and
groups can provide various motivations for the use of covert
channels. Examples include dissenting citizens versus their
governments, government agencies versus criminal or terrorist
organisations, or ‘black-hat’ hackers versus company IT de-
partments. Many network protocol-based covert channels have
been proposed [1], with limited work on covert channels in
networked games primarily focused on board games [2], [3].
In [4] we proposed a novel covert channel between players
in multiplayer first person shooter (FPS) online games (known
as FPSCC). FPSCC hides covert information in minute, ad-
ditional movements of player characters in the virtual world.
Character movements dictated by a human player are subject
to slight variations to covertly encode additional information.
The variations are chosen such that other human players
perceive no visible effect.
FPS games are common and their traffic is generally not
suspicious. They are typically based on the client-server ar-
chitecture, and FPSCC channels operate through regular, un-
modified game servers. As thousands of public, independently
operated game servers may be active on the Internet at any one
time [5], FPSCC’s users have many servers through which to
establish legitimate-looking overt traffic flows.
FPSCC has a number of desirable properties. FPSCC is an
indirect channel – covert sender and covert receiver use a game
server as an intermediary, rather than directly exchanging
IP packets. Detection of the covert sender does not directly
expose the identities of the covert receiver(s) (who could be
any of the players online at the same time). Some network-
based covert channels can be eliminated by, for example, pro-
tocol normalisation [1]. FPSCC cannot be eliminated without
eliminating player movement (thus destroying the game).
FPSCC could be used for collusion as well as exchang-
ing game-unrelated information unbeknownst to adversaries.
Capable adversaries could easily detect the use of overt com-
munication (e.g. instant messaging or voice over IP) as well as
the game-internal chat. Beyond games, many companies are
exploring the use of immersive virtual worlds (such as Second
Life [6]) for distributed training, collaboration and general
business – this opens up the potential for covert ex-filtration of
commercially sensitive information via FPSCC-like channels.
However, FPSCC only provides unreliable modulation and
demodulation of covert bits – the covert channel experiences
both bit substitution and bit synchronisation errors (bit dele-
tions and insertions). We now propose Reliable FPSCC (RF-
PSCC), an enhanced version of FPSCC tailored to the char-
acteristics of FPSCC’s overt channel to provide reliable data
transport. Furthermore, we propose an information-theoretic
model to estimate the capacity of an FPSCC channel
We use the open-sourced Quake III Arena (Q3) game [7] for
our proof-of-concept RFPSCC implementation (Q3 runs under
Windows and Linux and has a client-server communication
architecture similar to many other FPS games). Empirical tests
involved a large number of games and various degrees of
latency and packet loss impacting on the overt traffic between
game clients and server. RFPSCC is shown to be reliable (no
bit errors) and exhibits throughput ranging from 2 bits/s to over
13 bits/s. Like many covert channels RFPSCC has a low bit
rate, but it is sufficient for SMS-style text messages.
Section II reviews covert channel concepts and first person
shooter game protocols. Section III reviews the original FP-
SCC encoding scheme and its limitations. Our novel Reliable
FPSCC is then presented in Section IV. Section V reports on
the empirically measured throughput of RFPSCC, develops
an information-theoretic channel model and compares the
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measured throughput with the channel capacity. Section VI
concludes the paper and outlines future work.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Covert Channels
To summarise the discussion found in [1], covert channels
are often illustrated by Simmons’ prisoner problem [8] (Figure
1). Prisoners Alice and Bob must communicate to establish
an escape plan, but Wendy (the warden) monitors all their
messages. Any suspicious messages will result in Wendy
placing Alice and Bob into solitary confinement, preventing
escape. Alice and Bob must exchange innocuous messages
(overt channel) containing hidden information (covert channel)
that Wendy will (ideally) not notice.










Figure 1. Prisoner problem – communication model for covert channels
If Alice and Bob use two networked computers to communi-
cate, their covert channel may be encoded in subtle variations
of the network traffic flowing between their computers during
normal, innocuous activity. Alice and Bob must also share a
secret – knowledge of how the covert channel is encoded onto
the overt channel, and any additional authentication/encryption
applied to the covert channel messages.
In practice Alice and Bob may well be networked devices
controlled by the same person. For example, a corporate spy
might set up Alice and Bob on either sides of the company’s
network boundary to ex-filtrate restricted information. Wendy
is the network manager who can monitor the passing traffic
(looking for covert channels) or alter the passing traffic (to
disrupt or eliminate covert channels).
Alice and Bob are not required to be the sender and
receiver of the overt communication. One or both may be
compromised network devices along the overt traffic’s path
(known as middlemen). It is sufficient that Alice can observe
and manipulate overt traffic passing through, and Bob can
observe the overt+covert traffic passing through.
B. Quake III Arena Network Protocol
Q3’s client-server architecture uses UDP/IP to carry infor-
mation. RFPSCC utilises messages exchanged during game
play (Figure 2), and ignores network traffic associated with
server-discovery and initial client connection. Clients send
user commands to the server once per graphics frame rendered
(but no more than once every 10 ms). By default the server
sends snapshots (game world state updates) to clients every
50 ms. Transmissions in each direction are unsynchronised.
During game play user commands indicate player move-
ments, button states (keyboard and mouse) and the currently






Figure 2. Messages exchanged





Figure 3. Player character move-
ment
Movement occurs along three axes (x – left/right, y – up/down,
z – forward/backward) and change of view angle may be
requested along the x- and y-axes (pitch and yaw angles).
To compensate for packet loss, each UDP packet sent by the
client contains the current and previous user commands.
Snapshots contain the server’s authoritative belief about
the state of the client’s player (position, view angles and
player-specific events) as well as the state of all other entities
potentially visible to the client’s player (positions, view angles
and events). Entities can be other human player characters,
computer-controlled characters (bots) or objects. Entity state
updates are only sent for entities that the client’s player can
potentially see (which usually is a superset of the entities
actually visible on the player’s screen). This reduces network
traffic and mitigates a source of potential client-side cheating.
Q3 embeds sequence numbers in messages to detect packet
loss. Messages sent in ‘reliable’ mode (such as printing in-
game messages on client screens) are retransmitted when
lost. Lost user commands and entity state updates are never
retransmitted as they are continuously updated anyway. Times-
tamps are embedded in user commands sent by the client
and in player and entity state updates sent by the server.
Consequently every update of player state sent by the server
can be unambiguously linked to a corresponding (previous)
user command sent by a client. Although specific details differ,
most FPS game protocols utilise a similar overall design.
Figure 4 illustrates the relationship between player position
sent to the server, and player position received by other clients.
Define xi to be client 1’s player input for their character’s
position along an axis (or the view angle along an axis) in
user command i and define y j to be the position or view angle
of client 1’s character as sent by the server to both clients in
snapshot j. We assume xi and yi are integer values (or the
integer part of real values obtained using the floor operation).
As user commands are usually more frequent than snap-
shots, each y j is computed based on the most recently received
xi. Client 2 renders client 1’s player on screen based on y j until
it receives y j+1 (a period indicated by the boxes).
III. FPS COVERT CHANNEL (FPSCC)
A. Communication Model
FPSCC creates a covert channel using traffic between
two game clients. Alice (sender) and Bob (receiver) may






























Figure 4. Example user command values and server snapshot values
manipulating game traffic of unwitting players. Alice encodes
covert information by modulating xi from client 1 (Figure 4)
with visually imperceptible fluctuations in character position
or view angles. Bob decodes the covert information from y j
updates arriving in successive snapshots.
FPSCC aims to avoid detection by either the players con-
trolling the game clients, or by an adversary (Wendy). We
presume that Alice and Bob are not satisfied with using the
game’s built-in chat function or external messaging or voice
communication programs (as these are easily monitored by a
suitably-placed Wendy). In previous tests human players did
not notice the use of FPSCC and FPSCC-manipulated game
traffic looks similar to normal traffic [4]. However, a more in-
depth study of the security of the channel remains as future
work (many covert channels in the literature are detectable if
Wendy has knowledge of their encoding).
B. Encoding and Decoding
FPSCC modulates players view angle commands for pitch
(−87 to +87 degrees) and yaw (−180 to 180 degrees), as
player view angles are (with small exceptions discussed later)
almost entirely dictated by player input. We leverage the fact
that Q3 encodes more detail in xi and y j than can normally
be resolved visually by the human player. Other information
in user commands is less suitable. Position information may
be perturbed by various ‘forces’ acting on a player’s character,
making it hard to predict y j from xi. Surreptitious manipulation
of mouse button or key state is harder to hide from players,
and would result in an extremely low throughput.
As xi conveys relative view angles we use changes in view
angles to encode covert information. To minimise detection,
FPSCC only encodes covert information between two snap-
shots when players are adjusting their character’s view. If
players stop moving their view, the covert channel pauses.
Our initial experiments suggested that FPSCC is effectively
masked if FPSCC-induced changes are small compared to the
player’s own input [4].
Figure 5 illustrates the encoding of covert bits (using only
one angle), with a zero start value (y0 = 0) and the same user
input as Figure 4. One bit bn of covert information is encoded
per angle change – an even change signals a 0-bit and an odd











































































Figure 5. Example of covert channel encoding
are shown in bold, shaded regions indicate the time periods in
which a covert bit is transmitted.
Encoding and decoding can be summarised as follows (for
details the reader is referred to [4]). Alice encodes N bits of
covert information with an integer value of b (0≤ b≤ 2N−1)
into each angle change so that
b =
∣∣ỹ j− ỹ j−1∣∣ mod 2N , (1)
where ỹ j and ỹ j−1 are the angle values manipulated by
Alice. However, Alice can only indirectly modify y j by
modifying the user input xi, adding a small δi:
ỹ j = xi +δi. (2)












mod 2N xi− ỹ j−1 < 0
. (3)
Bob decodes the information using Equation 1, but cannot
distinguish between angle changes that do or do not contain
covert information. Unless Alice always has covert informa-
tion to transmit, from time to time Alice must send dummy
bits or cease encoding covert bits. In Section IV we introduce
an additional layer of encoding so Bob may reliably determine
if Alice is actually sending covert data.
In this paper we focus on using FPSCC for unicast trans-
mission. Alice knows the in-game identity of Bob’s client and
only sends covert data when Bob’s character is ‘visible’ to
Alice (determined from the snapshots). The covert channel will
pause whenever Bob is not visible. If Alice’s client’s identity
(e.g. player name) is known, Bob can focus on decoding ỹ j
updates relating to that specific player. If not, Bob can simply
attempt to decode covert information from ỹ j updates relating
to every player. Any stream of ỹ j updates that generates
‘meaningful’ covert information identifies Alice. (Meaningful
could mean pre-defined bit sequences [2] or previously agreed-
upon data structures.)
For Alice to compute the correct δi based on ỹ j−1 the
round trip time (RTT) between client and server, plus the
time between two user commands, must be smaller than the
time between two snapshots. If ∆u is the time between user
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commands and ∆s the time between snapshots the maximum
tolerable RTT is:
RT T ≤ ∆s−∆u. (4)
With snapshots every 50 ms, and user commands often
every 10 ms, we are apparently limited to RTT≤40 ms. A
small modification allows FPSCC to work over larger RTTs
at reduced throughput. Bits bn are actually sent in m server
snapshots, where m ≥ 2 and m ·∆s−∆u ≥ RT T . Server-time
timestamps ts are used to control which snapshots contain
covert bits. Alice and Bob only encode/decode from snapshots
where ts mod m = 0.
C. Sources of Bit Errors
FPSCC suffers from bit errors: substitutions (bits changed),
deletions (bits completely lost) and insertions (bits inserted).
To cull the number of objects rendered each frame, reduce
network traffic and mitigate cheating (chapter 7, [5]), snap-
shots only send the state of ‘potentially visible’ entities to
a player. Potential visibility is determined from visibility data
inside the map file and the actual positions of player and entity
on the map [9]. Potential visibility in Q3 is asymmetric (Bob
may not receive Alice’s state when Alice receives Bob’s state),
causing bit insertion and deletion errors [4].
Players respawn at various map locations after death or
when they enter teleportation devices. Respawning forces a
change in the player’s position and view angles, which causes
substitution errors if the dead (or teleported) player respawns
within the visible range of the other player.
If a client requests pitch angles below −87 or above
+87 degrees the Q3 server clamps the angles advertised in
subsequent snapshots. If x̃i is outside the allowed range, the
corresponding ỹ j will be clamped to either −87 or +87. This
causes substitution errors in the snapshot where the angle is
clamped and bit deletions in further snapshots (while the angle
is clamped). Moving platforms (movers) that player characters
can stand on also introduce errors. A rotating mover introduces
view angle changes unrelated to the player’s input, potentially
introducing bit substitutions.
Q3’s use of sequence numbers can detect re-ordering of user
commands or snapshots (due to UDP/IP packets being lost or
re-ordered). However, late user commands or snapshots are
simply ignored, and so re-ordered packets are effectively lost.
User commands are redundant, as several are sent between
two snapshots. If no user commands reach the server between
snapshots, Alice cannot send any bits. However, if some user
commands arrive it is crucial that at least one has covert
bits encoded based on the angle from the previous snapshot.
Otherwise, substitution errors can occur. Lost user commands
can never cause deletions or insertions, because Alice always
knows whether any bits were sent from the snapshots.
Loss of snapshots is worse than loss of user commands. If
the same snapshot is lost for Alice and Bob FPSCC remains
unaffected. But a snapshot that is lost for either Alice or Bob
causes bit deletions/insertions in the lost snapshot as well as
possible substitution errors in the following snapshot.
IV. RELIABLE FPSCC
Our novel scheme, tailored to the characteristics of FPSCC’s
overt channel, adds bit synchronisation, a framing layer to
provide frame/byte synchronisation and a transport layer to
provide encryption.
A. Bit Synchronisation
The basic idea of the scheme is that Alice explicitly lets
Bob know whether she can see him or not (and in the same
way Bob informs Alice). This requires the use of two special
channel symbols. If Alice sends an UNSYNC symbol to Bob,
she indicates that she cannot see Bob. If Alice sends a SYNC
symbol to Bob, she indicates that she can see Bob. A drawback
of using two special symbols is the increased amplitude of the
induced angle changes in order to have 2N +2 symbols. (Alice
could send special bit patterns instead of using two special
symbols, but this would decrease the throughput.)
Our scheme works even in the presence of substitution
errors, because Alice always determines whether she has sent
(UN)SYNC from the snapshots (rather than what she intended
to send). Since RFPSCC is used as bi-directional channel we
extend our notion of covert sender and receiver to covert peers.
Alice and Bob implement a state machine as shown in
Figure 6. Initially Alice and Bob are in IDLE state. A peer in
IDLE state sends UNSYNC symbols. When a peer in IDLE
state sees the other peer it goes into LISTEN state. In this state
a peer sends SYNC symbols. Only when both peers send a
SYNC to each other in the same snapshot, the channel’s state
changes to OPEN (because only then both peers can be sure
that they can see each other). Covert data is only exchanged
when the channel is OPEN. An OPEN channel goes back into
LISTEN state if an UNSYNC or SYNC is received, or back
into IDLE state if visibility is lost. The time period the channel














Figure 6. Bit synchronisation state machine
Furthermore, Alice and Bob can only enter OPEN state if
both players are alive, and they have to change from OPEN to
LISTEN if one or both players die. This is to prevent the case
that a dead player loses visibility and is then unable to send
an UNSYNC (dead players cannot send anything because they
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cannot move). Q3 sends player-death signals synchronously to
all players, so no further synchronisation problem arises.
There are two causes of teardown. Firstly, if a peer loses
visibility to the other peer, it changes into IDLE state. From
the next snapshot on it then sends UNSYNCs. The other peer
either loses visibility or receives an UNSYNC and then also
ends the transmission period. Secondly, if one or both peers’
players die, both peers go into LISTEN state.
In the first case, whichever peer lost visibility last has
potentially sent bits the other peer could not receive. To avoid
bit deletions these bits need to be re-sent. The problem is
to determine the exact number of bits. If a peer receives an
UNSYNC symbol it knows that the other peer lost visibility
in the previous snapshot and can re-send any bits sent in this
and the previous snapshot. (In the rare case that there is no
user angle change in the snapshot following the visibility loss,
RFPSCC enforces an angle change.)
However, there is still the case that neither peer receives an
UNSYNC, making it impossible to re-send the correct number
of bits. This happens when one peer loses visibility and the
other peer loses visibility in the following snapshot. This
problem can only be solved by involving the framing layer
(see next subsection). Nevertheless, note that the maximum
number of bit deletions is limited to 4N (both angles changed
in this and the previous snapshot).
RFPSCC also enforces a de-synchronisation of the channel
if a peer detects that it did not send the bits intended to be
send (as determined from the actual angle values in the next
snapshot). This prevents bit errors from movers. To avoid
pitch-clamping-related errors, a peer does not send any bits
in snapshots where the angle (plus FPSCC’s modifications) is
clamped. Similarly, a peer does not decode any bits while the
angle is clamped.
B. Framing and Transport
The main tasks of the framing layer are to solve the bit
synchronisation problem and to identify blocks of bytes in
the bit stream (byte synchronisation). There exist a number
of framing techniques, for example block length (fixed or
variable), or start of frame sequence and bit stuffing (e.g.
High-level Data Link Control – HDLC), or Cyclic Redundancy
Checksum (CRC) (e.g. Asynchronous Transfer Mode – ATM).
The approach of the RFPSCC framer is to use lower-layer
information. All the bits in a transmission period are treated
as one frame. Any incomplete bytes at the end of frames
are dropped by the receiver and re-sent by the sender. The
teardown bit synchronisation problem is solved as follows.
Both peers re-send all bits sent in the last two snapshots
before teardown, resulting in at most 4N bit insertions but
no bit deletions (see Figure 7). For N ≤ 2 at most one byte is
inserted. To prevent byte insertions, each peer sends the parity
of the length of the previous frame (odd or even) at the start of
the following frame (the decoding is delayed by one frame).
If a transmission period is so short that not all parity bits
could be sent, the sender will re-send the parity bits in the













Figure 7. Rollback of bits sent at the end of frames
(byte-aligned) and the maximum number of inserted bits is 8
it is guaranteed that any frames where the sender could not
send all parity bits are ‘empty’ at the receiver. If the actual
parity of a frame is different from the parity indicated by
the sender, the receiver drops the last byte before passing the
data to the transport layer. Our scheme supports larger N by
aligning frame sizes on multiples of 8 bits. For example, if
frames sizes are aligned to 16 bits (word-aligned) up to 16
inserted bits can be tolerated and hence N ≤ 4 (frame parity
is then computed based on the number of words).
The RFPSCC framing scheme solves the bit synchronisation
problem and has low overhead. To ensure byte synchronisa-
tion, any bits of incomplete bytes at the end of frames must be
dropped at the receiver and re-sent by the sender. Assuming
a uniform random distribution of the number of extra bits at
the end of frames, the mean overhead is 3.5 bits per frame
if frames are byte-aligned or 7.5 bits per frame if frames
are word-aligned. Since the number of substitution errors is
effectively zero (see Section V), only a single parity bit per
frame is needed. In comparison the overhead of HDLC is an 8-
bit preamble plus a number of stuffed bits per frame, whereas
the overhead for CRC-based framing is 32 bits (ATM).
There are no bit synchronisation errors above the framing
layer. This means the transport layer can use a fixed block-
size scheme (and therefore block ciphers for encryption). Since
there are no substitution errors above the framing-layer further
error detection or correction techniques are not necessary.
C. Packet Loss
Only the loss of snapshots affects bit synchronisation. To
avoid synchronisation errors we extended our scheme so that
transmission periods also end if one or more snapshots were
lost that are used for encoding/decoding (depending on the
RTT only every m-th snapshot is used).
Each peer can detect lost snapshots by tracking the Q3
sequence numbers. If Alice is sending/receiving data (in state
OPEN) and detects that snapshots were lost, she goes into
LISTEN state. In the next snapshot she will then send an
UNSYNC to Bob who will then also change to LISTEN state.
This is the same teardown sequence as described above.
The main difference is that more bits need to be re-sent.
To avoid bit deletions in any possible sequence of events Bob
needs to re-send all bits sent in the snapshot(s) lost for Alice
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and the two snapshots afterwards. However, Alice has no way
of indicating to Bob how many snapshots were lost. Hence the
number of bits to be re-sent is fixed during RFPSCC operation
and must be set according to the maximum possible number
of consecutive lost snapshots lmax (the maximum loss burst).
The maximum number of inserted bits is then (2+ lmax) ·2N.
In order to cope with more then 8 inserted bits, frame sizes
must be aligned to multiples of 8 bits as described previously.
For example, if N = 2 and bursts of up to 2 lost snapshots
shall be supported the maximum number of inserted bits at
the end of frames is 16. Word-aligned frames guarantee that
all bit insertions can be corrected.
Lost user commands can cause bit substitutions. These are
prevented because a peer also ends a transmission period when
it detects that the bits that were actually send are not equal to
the bits that should have been send (as described earlier).
D. Alternatives
Because of the asymmetric state exchange FPSCC has a
significant number of deletions and insertions that occur in
bursts. In our experiments we measured 3–4% deletions and
1–2% insertions [4]. In reality rates will likely vary depending
on the map, the number and behaviour of players etc.
Some coding schemes have been developed to deal with
deletion and insertion channels. However, as Mitzenmacher
points out in a recent paper, “[...] the problem of coding for
the deletion channel and other channels with synchronization
errors [...] remains a largely unstudied area.” and “[...] most
of the work in this area remains fairly ad hoc.” [10]. Many
schemes we examined have limitations which make them
unsuitable for FPSCC, such as they can handle only small
insertion/deletion rates of < 1%, can handle either insertions
or deletions but not both, or assume insertions/deletions are not
bursty. Also, implementations are usually not readily available.
Furthermore, coding schemes typically require careful pa-
rameter tuning in order to provide zero error rates with
minimum overhead. But this optimum is difficult to achieve
given FPSCC’s variable error rates. RFPSCC performs well
for varying error rates without any tuning.
V. ACHIEVABLE THROUGHPUT
We evaluated the achievable throughput of RFPSCC de-
pending on various factors such as the number of bits encoded
per angle change, network delay and packet loss.
A. Experimental Setup
RFPSCC was prototyped using our Covert Channels Evalu-
ation Framework (CCHEF, software for developing and evalu-
ating covert channels over IP networks) [11]. Our experiments
were a mix of tests in a controlled testbed and across real
Internet paths, with test machines consisting of two covert
game clients, a normal game client and a Q3 game server (all
Linux 2.6). The clients ran the Q3 client and CCHEF with
FPSCC module. To avoid bias, the covert data was uniform
random (same probability of one and zero bits, as one would
expect if Alice and Bob encrypted their data).
For delay and loss emulation in the testbed we used the
Netem framework built into the Linux kernel [12]. The Linux
kernels were recompiled with HZ=1000 in order to emulate
delays accurate to ±1 ms. We verified that Netem’s delay and
loss emulation is accurate prior to running the experiments.
We emulated RTTs of 25 ms (close server and very fast
network access), 75 ms (close server and typical network
access) and 125 ms (further away server and typical network
access). We chose 125 ms to be the maximum delay as
previous research showed that players aim for a maximum
RTT of 100–150 ms and higher RTTs noticeably affect their
performance [13], [14]. We used constant symmetric delays,
as for RFPSCC only the maximum RTT matters.
We emulated loss rates of 0%, 0.5% and 1% (in each
direction). For RFPSCC the limiting factor is not the loss
rate, but the maximum number of consecutive snapshots lost.
We assumed a maximum loss burst of 2 snapshots for 0.5%
and 3 snapshots for 1% loss rate (meaning a loss burst lasts
less than 150 ms and 200 ms respectively). Previous studies
showed that loss in the Internet is usually ≤ 1% [15]. This
is consistent with our measurements (see below) showing that
loss rates are far below 1% given high-speed broadband access.
Furthermore, while Q3 tolerates some loss, the loss rate needs
to be reasonably low for good game play [14].
Long measurements with human players are problematic,
as exhaustion or change in playing style over time possibly
introduces bias in the results. Therefore we used client-side
bots as players that behave consistently and never get tired
(Q3’s built-in bots cannot be used as they are part of the
server). We configured the bots to play as human-like as
possible (e.g. limited their speed). We also performed a limited
number of experiments with four human players in order to
compare the angle changes per second of bots and humans.
The angle change rates for yaw are surprisingly similar
(11.1 changes/s for bots compared to 12.2 changes/s for hu-
mans). But for pitch there is a larger difference (4.0 changes/s
for bots compared to 9.6 changes/s for humans). On the flat
map used in the experiments bots do not need to change pitch
very often, but randomness in mouse movements causes more
pitch changes for human players. This means that throughput
of RFPSCC is likely to be up to 40% higher for human players.
B. Results
We measured the throughput and bit error rate depending
on the number of players, bits encoded per angle (bpa), RTT
and packet loss rate. For each distinct parameter setting we let
the bots play five 1-hour games on the map q3dm1. The map
was restarted every 10 minutes, because deathmatch games
typically run for only 10–15 minutes (whoever has the most
kills wins) and then the map is restarted.
The throughput in both directions (Alice to Bob, Bob to
Alice) is very similar (differences ≤ 0.1 bits/s) and hence we
only plot the means in the following graphs. Figure 8(left)
compares the average throughput over increasing RTT for 1
and 2 covert bits encoded per angle change (bpa) and 2 or
3 players at 0% packet loss. Figure 8(right) compares the
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Figure 8. RFPSCC throughput depending on RTT (left) and packet loss rate (right)
average throughput over increasing loss rate for 1 and 2 bpa
and 2 or 3 players at an RTT of 75 ms (results for other RTTs
omitted for space reasons). The error bars denote the standard
deviation. The bit error rate was zero in all experiments.
The throughput of RFPSCC decreases fairly quickly with
increasing RTT. However, it decreases slightly less than ex-
pected. For example, throughout for 75 ms should be 50%
of the throughput for 25 ms (bits encoded in every second
snapshot), but the actual throughput reduces only to about 57%
(from 6.15 bits/s to 3.5 bits/s). This is because the higher the
latency, the longer the bots need to kill each other since aiming
becomes more difficult (same effect as for human players
[14]). For packet loss the throughput of RFPSCC decreases
more sharply between 0% and 0.5% and then the reduction
is slower. This is because just enabling loss support causes a
throughput reduction (and all experiments with 0% loss were
run with loss support disabled).
Because of limited resources we could only test RFPSCC
with 2 and 3 bot players. The throughput reduces with in-
creasing number of players and since the bots are unaware
and un-supportive of RFPSCC this trend would continue for a
larger number of players. However, in reality Alice and Bob
(if both are players and covert sender/receiver) could improve
throughput by staying in range of each other.
We also tested RFPSCC across the Internet. The two
Q3/RFPSCC clients were at the same location as before. The
Q3 server was located in a different part of Melbourne. At the
time of the experiments the clients were 15 hops away from
the server and the average RTT was 48–49 ms (as measured by
traceroute and ping). In some initial tests we measured snap-
shot loss rates between 0.0015% and 0.01% with only single
snapshots lost each time (indicating our non-bursty testbed
loss settings are justified). Hence we configured RFPSCC for
a maximum loss burst of 1 snapshot. We performed three 1-
hour measurements with 1 bpa and three 1-hour measurements
with 2 bpa. The throughput was 3.15±0.3 bits/s for 1 bpa and
6.25±0.2 bits/s for 2 bpa (with zero bit errors). These results
are consistent with the testbed measurements.
We conclude that RFPSCC is reliable. The throughput of
RFPSCC is fairly low, but it is still of the same magnitude
as the throughput of more sophisticated packet timing covert
channels that provide 6–20 bits/s [16]. Since game sessions
typically last from tens of minutes up to 1–2 hours [17], the
overall amount of data that can be transmitted is substantial.
C. Channel Capacity
We propose an information-theoretic channel model for
RFPSCC and compare the theoretic maximum achievable
transmission rate with zero bit errors (channel capacity) with
our empirically measured throughputs. The output of the
RFPSCC channel only depends on the input and the errors, but
not on previous inputs. Hence for 1 bpa encoding we model
the channel as a cascade of a binary symmetric channel (BSC)
and a binary memoryless combined deletion/insertion channel
with error rates pS, pD and pI (see Figure 9). The model can be
easily extended to 2 bpa encoding since the error probabilities




















Figure 9. Channel model for RFPSCC with 1 bit per angle encoding
Deletion/insertion/substitution channels have not been very
well studied [10]. Exact capacity limits are not known but
Gallager proved a lower bound of the capacity [18], [19]
C ≥ 1−H (pD)−H (pI)−H (pS) , (5)
where H (.) is the binary entropy. The Gallager model
does not make any assumptions on the error patterns. (The
Gallager bound was later improved but given our error rates
the difference is marginal.)
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From the empirical testbed measurements we examined the
average number of deletions, insertions and substitutions (as if
no synchronisation mechanism had been used). Insertion and
deletion rates are very similar to the rates observed for human
players (deletion rates of 3–4% and insertion rates of 1–2%
[4]). In the following we assume average rates of pD = 0.032
and pI = 0.016. The sole source of substitution errors were
too large time gaps between user commands (∆u > RT T −∆s,
see Section III-B) since the map has no teleporters or movers
and pitch clamping did not occur. For fast clients that send
user commands at least every 20 ms the substitution error rate
would be zero for our selected RTT values. However, in our
case there were few gaps of 30 ms. The substitution error rate
increases with increasing RTT, but even for 125 ms it was
much smaller than the deletion/insertion rates (pS = 0.0031).
Based on Equation 5 we estimate the lower bound of
the capacity in bits/symbol. The number of symbols (angle
changes) depends on the RTT and the player behaviour.
We computed the average symbol rate fS for the different
RTTs from the experimental data. The maximum achievable
transmission rate in bits/s is R≥C · fS. Table I compares the
maximum transmission rates with the measured throughputs
at 0% packet loss for different delays (values rounded).
Table I
COMPARISON OF THE CHANNEL CAPACITY LOWER BOUND WITH
EMPIRICALLY MEASURED THROUGHPUTS (BPA = BITS PER ANGLE)
RTT (ms) Maximum rate (bits/s) Throughput (bits/s)
1 bpa 2 bpa 1 bpa 2 bpa
25 6.9 13.8 6.2 (90%) 13.2 (96%)
75 4.2 8.4 3.5 (83%) 7.9 (94%)
125 3.1 6.2 2.4 (77%) 5.5 (89%)
Our RFPSCC scheme achieves 77–90% (1 bpa) and 89–
96% (2 bpa) of the capacity lower bound. The overhead is
roughly 0.6–0.7 bits/s regardless of the RTT and number of
bits encoded per angle. Leigh compares the capacity lower
bound with the rate of efficient watermark codes (assuming
zero substitution errors) [19]. Given the error rates of RFPSCC
the best watermark code provides roughly 0.5 bits/symbol
meaning it achieves ∼ 75% of the capacity. This is less than
what RFPSCC achieves for non-zero substitution error rates.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We have proposed and prototyped Reliable FPSCC (RFP-
SCC), an enhanced version of FPSCC (covert channels within
traffic of online first person shooter games [4]). We have
also demonstrated an information-theoretic model to estimate
RFPSCC channel’s capacity and implemented a proof-of-
concept using Quake III Arena. Our solution eliminates the
synchronisation and substitution bit errors on the original
FPSCC covert channel caused by asymmetric state exchange
and packet loss in the overt channel (game traffic).
We analysed RFPSCC in a local testbed with different
number of players, network delays and packet loss rates,
and across the Internet. Using Quake III Arena, RFPSCC is
capable of error-free throughput between 2–13 bits/s, even with
modest packet loss in the overt channel. RFPSCC’s throughput
is similar to that of more sophisticated packet-timing covert
channels, and is sufficient to covertly engage in low-speed
text messaging or general data transfers. Key advantages of
RFPSCC are that it is an indirect channel and cannot be
eliminated without eliminating the overt channel (the game).
The application of RFPSCC to non-FPS online games or
immersive virtual worlds where player or character move-
ments are regularly propagated to other participants (and
their clients) remains future research. We also plan a more
detailed evaluation of RFPSCC’s performance (more trials
with human players and different game/network settings) and
hope to improve RFPSCC in the presence of large network
delays. Finally, we plan to explore techniques for detecting
RFPSCC in regular game traffic and to extend our channel
model towards packet loss.
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